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The Convergence of the Law of State
Responsibility for Injury to Aliens and
International Human Rights Norms in
the Revised Restatement
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU*
The now celebrated (infamous to some) section 711 of the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Re-
vised)' ("Revised Restatement") is meant to replace the allegedly
dated and obtuse black-letter content2 of sections 178 through 183
of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
* DiplSme Sup6rieur d'Etudes FranCaises, Universith de Poitiers (1971); A.B., Bowdoin
College (1972); J.D., University of Virginia (1978); M.A., Oxford University (1979); MA,
University of Virginia (1979); LL.M., Columbia University (1979); J.S.D., Columbia Univer-
sity (1984); Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director, Eason-Weinmann Center For
Comparative Law, Tulane University.
A preliminary and abbreviated version of this Article was presented as a paper to the
Panel on State Responsibility of the American Society of International Law on April 11,
1984. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the members of the Panel for their
helpful comments and observations. Professor Joseph M. Sweeney read the draft version
and made useful suggestions. The author owes special thanks to Professor Richard B. Lil-
lich, who provided the opportunity for pursuing this research and gave indispensable and
invaluable guidance in the construction of the analysis. Any errors or omissions, of course,
remain the author's responsibility.
1. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1984). The section addressed in this Article is found in Tentative Draft No. 3 of the
Revised Restatement. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
§ 711 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Restatement (Revised)].
2. 59 A-L.I. Proc. 243 (1982) (comment by Professor Henkin) [hereinafter cited as A.L.I.
Proceedings]. "[W]e have here... minimized the use of black letter. We find that black
letter is the Institute shouting. It does not say very subtle things. On Comment we can
converse, and the Reporters whisper down in the Notes. The experience with the black let-
ter in the first Restatement was really not encouraging .... " Id. See also infra notes 83.86
and accompanying text.
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United States' ("Second Restatement") with more contemporary,
subtle, and economical provisions. 4 The proponents of section 711,
namely, Professor Henkin, the Chief Reporter for the new Restate-
ment, and Professor Wechsler, formerly the Director of the Ameri-
can Law Institute, assert that the considerably reduced substance
of the proposed section evidences nothing more than a stylistic
change which is in keeping with the new drafting format for the
entire Restatement.5 In fact, they contend that the mere passage of
time and the concomitant academic need to update the Restate-
ment with current developments were the principal motives for the
"cosmetic" surgery.6 According to the Reporters' notes, "[t]his sec-
tion [§ 711] and §§ 712-13 condense §§ 178-96 of the previous Re-
statement, but do not differ from them in substance in any major
respect."7 Also, Professor Wechsler states in the foreword to Ten-
tative Draft No. 3 of the Revised Restatement that "[t]he formula-
tions addressed to injury to nationals of other states . . . greatly
compress the treatment in Part IV of the original [Restatement]
but propose no major change of substance. The apprehensions
some have expressed upon that score are quite unfounded, in my
view. ' 8
3. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Restatement (Second)].
4. See A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 227.
5. See id.
6. See id. Professor Henkin states that:
This part looks quite different from the treatment of the subject in the previous
Restatement for a number of reasons. One is that we have condensed many
parts, including this one, in recognition of the fact that we have expanded very
widely in other respects. Secondly, the coming of human rights has had impact
also on the law of treatment of aliens, and we reflect that in Section 711.
Thirdly, we have tried to follow in this the same pattern we followed . . . [in
drafts 1, 2, and the rest of 3] . . . of fairly stark and lean black letter and fuller
Comments and still fuller Reporters' Notes. So I think I can state for the Re-
porters-and I was glad to see that the Director in his Introduction agreed with
us and made the point-that the changes in this law, while they make it look
different, have not been of substance. (I am quoting from viii, Professor Wechs-
ler's Foreword [in Tentative Draft No. 3]). We are satisfied that we propose no
major change of substance. The distribution between black letter and Comment
and Reporters' Notes is partly a matter of taste and style. It may be partly also
a recognition that some things are not as readily put in black letter when the
situation in international law is so different from what it was twenty-five years
ago.
Id. at 227.
7. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, § 711 Reporters' note 9.
8. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, at viii.
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This Article briefly assesses the significance of these disclaimers
against the unmistakable "new look" of section 711. Even upon ini-
tial perusal, the divergence in content and presentation between
the existing provisions and the recommended formulation of the
law of state responsibility for injury to aliens ("S.R.I.A.") is so
striking that it is difficult to find any common ground in which to
anchor an attempt at meaningful comparison. For example, in re-
gard to the elaboration of formal rules, the content of proposed
section 711 represents only about a quarter of the express provi-
sions contained in the Second Restatement." Moreover, it elimi-
nates virtually all of the accepted concepts, definitions, and con-
secrated formulae which applied in state responsibility practice,
replacing them with more abstract and less specific human rights
language, thereby robbing the law of S.R.I.A. of its established
framework and predictability. In real as well as proverbial terms,
apples and oranges do differ, and-no matter how adept the argu-
ments to the contrary-can rarely be successfully compared or as-
similated to one another. In effect, the Reporters' disclaimers not-
withstanding, the allegedly innocent drafting modifications
introduced in section 711 appear to have resulted in a dramatic
change in the format, presentation, and most importantly, in the
9. On the Second Restatement, see generally Fisher, Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: A Preface, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2 (1966); Garretson, The Immunities of Representa-
tives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 67 (1966); Lissitzyn, The Law of International
Agreements in the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 96 (1966); Meeker, Recognition and the
Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83 (1966); Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States: Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U. L Rev. 7
(1966); Murphy, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 125 (1966);
Oliver, The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 428 (1961); Pugh & McLaughlin, Jurisdictional Immu-
nities of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 25 (1966); Rosenne, Interpretation of Treaties in
the Restatement and the International Law Commission's Draft Articles: A Comparison, 5
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 205 (1966); Sweeney, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States and the Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 16 Syracuse L
Rev. 762 (1965); Almond, Book Review, 53 A.B.A. J. 355 (1967); Briggs, Book Review, 61
Am. J. Int'l L. 213 (1967).
On the Revised Restatement, see Baxter, A New Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 (1978); Goldklang, Customary International
Law and U.S. Laws, Int'l Prac. Notebook, Apr. 1983, at 16-17; Henkin, Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 954 (1980); Henkin,
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft
No. 2, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 987 (1981); Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 3, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 653 (1982); Murphy,
Customary International Law in U.S. Jurisprudence, Int'l Prac. Notebook, Oct. 1982, at 17-
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sources of the law of S.R.I.A. Given the radical character of these
modifications, it is difficult to see how they can avoid having sub-
stantive implications.
The rationale for the reorientation in approach and substance
seems to be both clear and sensible. The Reporters were seeking to
cast the rules relating to the protection of aliens in a more contem-
porary form by merging the traditional law of S.R.I.A. with the
more recently elaborated, and still evolving, international human
rights law.' ° Their objective was to achieve an amalgam of legal
principles under which each legal doctrine would conserve its sub-
stantive integrity while being merged in a new synthetic set of con-
cepts. In some respects, this goal was foreshadowed by the work of
Garcia-Amador who, as the International Law Commission's Spe-
cial Rapporteur on State Responsibility from 1955 to 1961, sought
to attenuate the conflict between the international minimum stan-
dard and the national treatment doctrine (and thereby achieve a
wider acceptance of S.R.I.A.) by couching the former in language
reflecting contemporary international human rights norms.1" More-
over, other scholars, both prior to and following Garcia-Amador's
efforts, advocated such cross-fertilization.'2
Assuming that this analysis accurately characterizes the Report-
ers' aim, and that such aim is perceived as an acceptable goal, the
critical question becomes whether the infusion of human rights
language into the proposed language of section 711 constitutes a
successful synthesis of the old law with the new. Stated differently
but more pointedly, does the purported human rights gloss, in ef-
fect, subsume entirely the law of S.R.I.A. and undermine its status
as a corpus of well-settled principles of customary international
10. As stated by the Reporters:
Part VII, Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical), looks substantially
different from the treatment of those matters in the previous Restatement. It
includes the international law of Human Rights, which has developed considera-
bly in the past decades and has influenced the traditional law of state responsi-
bility for injury to aliens. That law, especially as it relates to economic injury, is
in some disarray but this draft does not differ from the previous Restatement in
major respects on substantive issues (although the subject is presented differ-
ently and treated in briefer compass, in accordance with the over-all plan of the
revised Restatement).
Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, at xxiv.
11. See Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens, in International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 1, 17 (R. Lillich
ed. 1983).
12. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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law? As one distinguished scholar has cogently noted, "[t]o argue
that a limited but nevertheless relatively effective regime gov-
erning aliens should be scrapped for an unrealized ideal one cover-
ing all persons hardly seems consistent with a genuine concern for
the promotion and protection of human rights."' 3
It is the thesis of this Article that the proposed content of sec-
tion 711 fails to mediate properly between the convergent develop-
ments and to create a new set of juridical principles in a synthesis
which preserves each development's own specificity and allows the
law of S.R.I.A. to gain greater contemporary currency in the world
community. The incorporation of human rights language is unfor-
tunate because it is largely uncontrolled; it so collapses the recog-
nized rules of S.R.I.A. that nearly no guidance is now available, for
example, on what constitutes a "denial of justice." No matter how
acceptable the theoretical objective, there is a clear need for a bet-
ter (in the sense of more balanced) accommodation of the two de-
velopments-an accommodation, in effect, which would allow the
law of S.R.I.A. to conserve some measure of substantive autonomy.
I. THE CONVERGENT DOCTRINES
A. The Law of International Human Rights
The concept of human rights14 has longstanding general anteced-
ents, dating back to the Code of Hammurabi, running through
Greek philosophy, Roman Law, as well as the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition, and resurfacing in the humanism of the Reformation, the
Enlightenment, and in the liberal democratic tradition of Western
Europe.15 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen of 1789 represents an early European codification; human
rights principles guided the First Continental Congress to the Dec-
laration of Rights of October 14, 1774; finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the U.S. Bill of Rights unequivocally advocates the
protection of the individual against the state."6
Prior to the Second World War and the advent of the United
13. See Lilich, supra note 11, at 9.
14. See A. Gewirth, Human Rights 1.4 (1982); Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1582 (1981).
15. A. Robertson, Human Rights in the World 3, 8 (2d ed. 1982).
16. See id. at 4, 6-7; see also McKay, What Next?, in Human Dignity 65, 65-66 (L. Hen-
kin ed. 1979); Wyzanski, The Philosophical Background of the Doctrines of Human Rights,
in Human Dignity 9, 9-13 (L. Henkin ed. 1979).
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Nations, the view that human rights consisted of a relationship be-
tween an individual and a state impeded the emergence of an in-
ternational body of human rights law.17 Since states and inter-state
conduct were the only proper subjects of international law, a rela-
tionship implicating a private person was not envisaged as part of
traditional international law.18 For example, the rule of national
sovereignty dictated that, except in a situation of humanitarian in-
tervention, the way in which a state treated its own nationals was
solely within that state's jurisdiction.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, under the U.N.
Charter, the concept of international human rights achieved a
more solid footing in terms of legal doctrine."9 The very existence
of the United Nations and its subsequent work began eroding the
hegemony of the national sovereignty rule.20 The U.N. Charter, for
instance, reflects an international consensus on the protection of
certain core rights against violative conduct, namely, "genocide,
mass killings, torture, and severe cases of racial discrimination."2'
The gravamen of the Charter is to offer protection against "gross
violations of human rights."2 2 Also, under article 56 of the Charter,
states are obligated to protect human rights.2 3
The work of the United Nations ultimately led to a general ac-
knowledgement of international human rights in the form of inter-
national treaties and conventions. By the late 1970's, the vast ma-
jority of states had recognized the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
17. See Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth
Century, in R. Lillich & F. Newman, International Human Rights: Problems of Law and
Policy 1 (1979).
18. See A. Robertson, supra note 15, at 2 ("[Tlhe 'so-called rights of man' not only do
not, but cannot enjoy any protection under international law, because that law is concerned
solely with relations between States and it cannot confer rights on individuals."); Starke,
Human Rights and International Law, in Human Rights 113 (E. Kamenka & A. Tay eds.
1978). "The classical expression of the doctrine is that a State is responsible to another
State for internationally wrongful conduct only when such conduct is attributed to the State
itself." Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility, in International
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 321, 347 n.4 (R. Lillich ed. 1983).
19. See D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
1110, 1110 (1982). See generally M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Human Rights and
World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (1980).
20. See A. Robertson, supra note 15, at 24-35.
21. McKay, supra note 16, at 67.
22. See id.
23. U.N. Charter art. 56; see Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human
Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 643, 646-53 (1951).
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the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, and the Optional Protocol Relating to Implementation of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-known together as the
"International Bill of Rights."24 Regional action, most notably the
European Convention on Human Rights, accompanied the U.N.
activity. The European Convention, which was ratified by all mem-
bers of the Council of Europe except Liechtenstein, protects
nineteen separate rights; its objective is to promote the political
rights contained in the Universal Declaration.2"
These developments illustrate that human rights considerations
have become a significant factor in the mind of the international
community and are having an important impact upon world public
opinion. Indeed, the emerging law of international human rights
has become the linchpin concept in the international protection of
the individual against state interference. Despite the greater speci-
ficity and deeper historical basis of the law of S.R.I.A., the parallel
between it and international human rights is striking. Their simi-
larity of purpose-providing essential guarantees to persons
against improper state action-probably incited the Reporters of
section 711 to consider synthesizing the two developments.
It should be underscored that this idea and approach, despite
the paucity of contemporary attention it has received and Garcia-
Amador's unsuccessful earlier attempt to implement it, had been
espoused by a number of prominent commentators prior to the re-
vision of the Restatement. For example, in 1951, the late Professor
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A16316
(1966); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). See M. McDougal,
H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 179-80; J. Sweeney, C. Oliver & N. Leech, The
International Legal System 592-93 (1981). See generally Buergenthal, Codification and Im-
plementation of International Human Rights, in Human Dignity 16 (L. Henkin ed. 1979).
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
See F. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (1975); Robertson, supra note
15, at 80-82. See generally C. Morrisson, Jr., The Dynamics of Development in the European
Human Rights Convention System (1981); Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary Inter-
national Law and the Significance of the European Convention, in The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 1 (Brit. Inst. Int'l & Comp. L., Int'l L. Ser. No. 5, 1965); cf. American
Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, OA.S. T.S. No. 36, re-
printed in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Handbook of Existing Rules Per-
taining to Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/IL59, doc. 6, at 27 (1980).
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Fenwick asserted that the international minimum standard apply-
ing to the protection of aliens "now finds expression in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. '2 6 Professor McDougal, like
other writers,27 asserted that "contemporary human rights pre-
scriptions .. .would indeed appear, however these prescriptions
may ultimately be synthesized with the older doctrine of State re-
sponsibility, to have importantly increased the transnational pro-
tection that world constitutive process affords aliens. '2 Professor
McDougal then concluded that the human rights movement
awards aliens and nationals the same protection, thus raising the
international standard for all people. 9
B. The Law of S.R.I.A.
The law of state responsibility for injury to aliens protects indi-
viduals living in another country by assessing liability upon that
country for harm done to them.30 It developed from a "body of
principles which, through being repeatedly invoked diplomatically
and by international commissions during the nineteenth century,
gradually hardened into a set of rules. . .. -31 As early as 1758,
Vattel called for the elaboration of a set of legal principles (in the
form of diplomatic protection) designed to afford protection to
26. Fenwick, The Progress of International Law During the Past Forty Years, 79 Recuejl
des Cours (Hague Academy of International Law) 1, 44 (1951), cited in Lillich, Duties of
States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, 161 Recueil des Cours (Hague Academy of In-
ternational Law) 329, 391 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lillich, Hague Lectures].
27. See Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 391 n.394 (listing, inter alia, Amer-
asinghe, Brownlie, Humphrey, Jennings, Moseler, McDougal, Murphy, and Waldock).
28. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World
Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 432,
456 (1976), cited in Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 393.
29. [T]he principle thrust of the contemporary human rights movement is to award
nationals the same protection formerly accorded only to aliens, while at the
same time raising the standard of protection for all human beings, nationals as
well as aliens, far beyond the minimum standard developed under the earlier
customary law .... The consequence is thus, as Dr. Garcia-Amador insisted,
that continuing debate about doctrines of the minimum international standard
and equality of treatment has now become highly artificial; an international
standard is now authoritatively prescribed for all human beings.
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 28, at 464.
30. See Bishop, Foreword, in International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens x (R. Lillich ed. 1983); Christenson, supra note 18, at 347 n.4; M. McDougal, H.
Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 181; Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Resid-
ing Abroad, 4 Am. J. Int'l L. 517 (1910). For a discussion of the historical background of
S.R.I.A., see Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 343-56.
31. Lillich, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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aliens.3 2 In fact, with hindsight, one can ascertain that, during the
period in which the rule of national sovereignty applied and inter-
national human rights had not yet been recognized, the law of
S.R.I.A. served as a critical source of protection for aliens as indi-
viduals.33 The rules that were articulated progressively, defining a
standard of conduct meant to embody an enlightened view of jus-
tice,3 4 satisfied the need to provide transnational protection of in-
dividual rights by defining an international minimum standard of
treatment for aliens.3 5 According to Professor Lillich:
The substitution of diplomatic protection for private re-
prisals and the elaboration of norms governing the Re-
sponsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens that not only
embraced but went well beyond the older denial of jus-
tice concept constituted a significant step forward by the
international community. Indeed, most of the rules gen-
erated by this process . . . were accepted as and remain
today good international law-those rules, for instance,
governing the eligibility of claimants, the attribution of
responsibility and the measure of damages.3 8
Confiscatory policies and ensuing wealth deprivation claims,
however, blurred the consensus and brought revisionist opposition,
especially from Latin American countries. There, the law of
S.R.I.A. was perceived as a smoke screen for the promotion of
Western imperialist interests, especially in the property area.37
Emphasizing the absolute prerogatives stemming from state sover-
32. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 746. Vattel stated:
whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that
citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed, and, if possi-
ble, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise
the citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.
Id. (quoting Vattel, Classics of International Law- The Law of Nations or the Principles of
Natural Law 136 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916)).
33. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 181.
34. See Lillich, supra note 11, at 3.
35. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 181.
36. Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 347.
37. See Lillich, supra note 11, at 2-4. According to Dr. Castafieda, "' [ t he doctrine of
responsibility of states... was merely the legal garb that served to cloak and protect the
imperialistic interests of the international oligarchy during the nineteenth century and the
first part of the twentieth."' Id. at 2 (quoting Castafleda, The Underdeveloped Nations and
the Development of International Law, 15 Int'l Org. 38, 39 (1961)). See also Lillich, Hague
Lectures, supra note 26, at 347-50; Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad:
An Elementary Principle of International Law Under Attack, 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 359 (1975).
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eignty, the Calvo Doctrine argued for the exclusivity of local reme-
dies and advocated that the national treatment doctrine supplant
the international minimum standard as the applicable rule.3 8 The
substantive differences between the two standards appear irrecon-
cilable: the national treatment doctrine eliminates international
accountability of the state for injuries to aliens.39 It is "'a scheme
of non-responsibility' under which the States would be immune
from the claims of the international legal order. '40 In effect, since
an alien is not afforded a higher standard of treatment than a na-
tional, the doctrine serves to protect the state from the alien rather
than the contrary.41 In contradistinction, the international mini-
mum standard provides, as a corollary claim to the state sover-
eignty rule, that the practice of civilized nations posits a standard
of basic treatment for aliens which applies regardless of how a
state may treat its own nationals.
The controversy generated by these competing interpretations of
the law of S.R.I.A. quite evidently imperiled the international sta-
tus and viability of the traditional alien protection rules. Ulti-
mately, due to the body of normative rules that had evolved in the
area, the debate was premised upon larger grounds epitomizing the
fundamental conflict, namely, the rift between the actors in the
North-South axis and the view that an "inequality of strength"
amounted per force to an "inequality of rights." '42 The obvious in-
38. See Lillich, supra note 11, at 4; M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19,
at 751. See generally C. Calve, Le Droit International Th~orique et Pratique (5th ed. 1896);
F. Dawson & I. Head, International Law, National Tribunals and the Rights of Aliens 15-19
(1971); D. Shea, The Calve Clause (1955); Hershey, The Calve and Drago Doctrines, 1 Am.
J. Int'l L. 26 (1907).
39. See A. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens 117
(1949).
40. Lillich, supra note 11, at 5 (citing Goebel, The International Responsibility for Inju-
ries Sustained by Aliens on Account of Mob Violence, Insurrections, and Civil Wars, 8 Am.
J. Int'l L. 802, 831 (1914)). According to Professor Lillich, "the national treatment doctrine
as advanced by the Latin American States became essentially a protective shield against
potential international responsibility for the maltreatment of aliens." Lillich, Hague Lec-
tures, supra note 26, at 350.
41. A. Roth, supra note 39, at 117; see M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note
19, at 752. See generally A. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial
of Justice 456-61 (1938); Lissitzyn, The Meaning of the Term Denial of Justice in Interna-
tional Law, 30 Am. J. Int'l L. 632 (1936).
42. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 760. See generally Brower
& Tepe, The Character of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection
of International Law?, 9 Int'l Law. 295 (1975); White, A New International Economic Or-
der?, 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 323 (1976).
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tersection between the law of S.R.I.A. and the emerging interna-
tional human rights norms fostered the view that the ostensibly
more universal human rights principles should be adopted as the
standard by which to establish the international protection of the
individual, whether the individual was perceived as a foreign na-
tional or, more generally, as a human being."3
Despite the fact that human rights norms had not been formally
acknowledged by all states, the International Law Commission
(I.L.C.), through the work of Garcia-Amador as Special Rap-
porteur," attempted to eliminate the opposition between the advo-
cates of the national treatment doctrine and the proponents of the
international minimum standard "by treating both theories as hav-
ing been superseded by the new international human rights norms
that had emerged since World War H.'"4" The adversaries of such
an approach, however, prevailed; many countries were reluctant to
accept Garcia-Amador's proposal to include a non-exhaustive list
of fundamental human rights in the codification of the law of state
responsibility. In fact, his commission expired without any action
being taken on his proposals." As Professor Lillich contends, the
lack of support given to Garcia-Amador's efforts stems from the
fact
that he was not so much "bridging the gap" between the
international minimum standard and the national treat-
ment doctrine as he was adopting the former and then
progressively developing it by vouching in contemporary
international human rights norms. The "'noble synthe-
sis'" being advanced, in short, was not really the one ar-
ticulated by the Special Rapporteur but instead one be-
tween the traditional law governing the treatment of
aliens (subsumed under the rubric of the international
minimum standard) and the newly emerging interna-
tional law of human rights.47
It appears that the text of section 711 attempts to renew these ef-
43. See Lillich, supra note 11, at 9.
44. See id. at 17.
45. Id. See Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 373-79. See also Ago, First Report
on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 & Add.1 (1969), reprinted in [19691 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 125, 127, 133, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969IAdd.l.
46. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 763.
47. Lillich, supra note 11, at 18-19 (citations omitted).
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forts and to function as a more fertile breeding ground by which to
achieve a synthesis of the two developments in international law.
II. RESTATEMENT NEUTRALITY: A QUERY
In terms of its sources and objectives, the Restatement is neither
a code (in the civil law sense of that word) nor a statute. It repre-
sents the private efforts of distinguished American jurists, special-
ists in the field, to fulfill the neutral mandate of "stat[ing] and
clarify[ing] existing law, international and domestic," 48 essentially
to prophesy what an international tribunal would do were it faced
with the issue under consideration. 49 The Restatement is the prod-
uct of "[t]he American Law Institute, a private body in the United
States dedicated to the clarification and improvement of the law;"
it "has no official standing as a statement of the position of the
United States;" "[n]or does it propose rules of law for adoption." 0
Its influential stature stems from the considerable scholarly and
professional prestige of the members of the Institute. By way of
rough comparison, the Restatement, although presented in codified
form rather than in the usual scholarly analytic medium, could be
viewed, systematically and substantively, as generally similar to
the work of la doctrine in the French legal system.
In an age in which there is mounting concern about the extrater-
ritorial application of domestic concepts of legality, and in which
the North-South rift is widening and becoming increasingly con-
spicuous, the domestic origin of the Restatement, as well as its un-
official standing and elaboration in an advanced Western country,
could limit its effectiveness as a statement of international law. Es-
pecially in the area of the law of S.R.I.A., the differing cultural,
juridical, ideological, and moral assumptions between developed
and developing states can be, and as previously noted, are, acute.
Mindful of these difficulties and potential limitations, the Re-
porters of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law em-
phasized their neutral objective "to state and clarify" the U.S. law
in this area, while acknowledging that the law in question was not
48. Restatement (Second), supra note 3, at xi.
49. Id. at xii. "Thus the Restatement of this Subject, in stating rules of international law,
represents the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules that an international
tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with interna-
tional law." Id.
50. Id. at xi.
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merely domestic:
The Foreign Relations Law of the United States in-
cludes portions of international law, as that term is used
to describe the legal aspects of relations between nations,
and that part of the domestic law of the United States
that is involved in the conduct of the foreign relations of
the United States, including constitutional law and some
portions of conflict of laws."
While the foregoing statement allays some of the concern and, to
some extent, renders transparent the objective of predicting how
an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice
would reason and rule when confronted with a particular question,
its taxonomic orientation minimizes the true difficulties and leaves
essential problems unresolved. It is one thing to state that the U.S.
Executive and Senate share responsibility in the area of treaties. It
is quite another thing, however, to deal, for example, with the con-
troversial issue of defining the role of domestic courts in articulat-
ing international law norms or applying public policy provisions of
domestic statutes in international cases. The very statement of do-
mestic policies, or even a framing of the issues in national legal
terminology, could generate conflict and misunderstanding in the
international community and undermine the credibility of the
prophesizing document.
More particularly, in attempting "to state and clarify existing
law, international and domestic," must the Restatement provisions
envisage rules exclusively from a domestic perspective, stating the
U.S. position with the view of having it forge a consensus position
in the international community? Or should the Restatement artic-
ulate rules which are broadly acknowledged and accepted among
states, thereby guiding national U.S. policies toward an alignment
with an existing international consensus? Should the provisions be
stated in broad language which promotes agreement or be articu-
lated in terms of specific and detailed national concerns and preoc-
cupations? In a word, is the Restatement intended to acquiesce in
developments in the international community, or is it intended to
mold emerging trends in the light of perceived U.S. interests and
values?
Given the context in which the Restatement is destined to oper-
51. Id.
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ate, it is difficult to see how even the most studied effort can main-
tain full neutrality. It is even more difficult to see how a radical
change in methodology and terminology cannot but have an im-
pact upon the basic orientation of the document and its substan-
tive content or represent some veering of position on an essential
and delicate question.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SECOND RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS
At first blush, sections 178 through 183 of the Second Restate-
ment, when referring to an international standard of justice, 2 ap-
pear to define and discuss that standard in terms of concepts that
are characteristic of U.S. legal analysis. For example, the calculus
that is devised to assess the international legality of, and liability
for, state conduct which causes injury to aliens is addressed in part
in terms of a "denial of procedural justice ' '5 3 (as well as by refer-
ence to circumstances involving a taking without compensation 4).
Also, the elements of a cause of action, stated in some detail in a
black-letter format,5 5 appear to be formulated in terms of U.S.
constitutional due process concerns. In light of these features of
the black-letter provisions, one wonders whether the rules,
grounded as they appear to be in the specificity of a particular na-
tional legal tradition, are expressive of a truly international stan-
dard. The concept of procedural justice, it could be argued, is inex-
tricably tied to the common law tradition that espouses and
consecrates the view that there can be "no rights without reme-
dies." When seen in the light of the systemic, ideological, and eco-
nomic tensions that plague the contemporary world community,
the Second Restatement's ostensible American bent and cachet
might breed accusations of cultural and ideological imperialism,
and lessen considerably its viability as a document stating gener-
52. For example, section 178 of the Second Restatement provides:
As used in the Restatement of this Subject, "denial of procedural justice" means
conduct, attributable to a state and causing injury to an alien, that departs from
the international standard of justice specified in § 165 with respect to the pro-
cedure followed in enforcement of the state's law as it affects the alien in crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative proceedings, including the determination of his
rights against, or obligations to, other persons.
Id. § 178 (emphasis added). See also id. § 179 (cause for justifying arrest under the "interna-
tional standard of justice").
53. Id. § 178.
54. Id. § 180 comment c, illustration 1.
55. See id. §§ 179 (arrest and detention procedures), 183 (protection from private injury).
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ally recognized rules and accepted principles of international law.
However, upon further scrutiny, the references and discussion in
the Second Restatement's comments and Reporters' notes indicate
that, while some of the phrasing and terminology of the black-let-
ter provisions may appear to be particularly American, their sub-
stance reflects a much broader consensus (in theory if not in prac-
tice) as to applicable principles. Despite procedural differences
among civil law, common law, and soviet-socialist legal systems,
sections 178 through 183 of the Second Restatement elaborate
principles of adjudicatory justice which have attained an agreed-
upon customary status among the community of nations and to
which all states at least pay lip service. The references used to cor-
roborate the existence of these principles include: international ar-
bitral decisions,56 various bilateral and multilateral agreements,
domestic constitutions of states, 8 the Council of Europe Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 59 and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.60
There appears to be wide international agreement, not localized
exclusively in the developed West, but including Latin American
countries and soviet-socialist states, that, in principle, it would be
wrong to deny aliens the rights provided for in the Second Restate-
ment. To some extent, the European Convention and the subse-
quent American Convention on Human Rights (the 1969 Pact of
San Jos6, Costa Rica)61 go beyond the provisions of the American
due process view and are, in fact, more liberal and supportive of
the procedural rights of human beings against state encroachment.
In this sense, the provisions contained in the Second Restatement
perhaps represent a statement of the early development of human
rights law. In regard to the Revised Restatement, the critical ques-
tion becomes one of how to pursue and refine this convergence of
doctrine.
56. See id. § 179 Reporters' notes 1-5 (discussing international arbitral decisions involving
denial of procedural justice); id. § 182 Reporters' note 1 (unjust determinations); id. § 183
Reporters' note (failure to provide protection from private injury).
57. See id. § 179 Reporters' notes 1, 2 (citing bilateral and multilateral agreements pro-
viding for preliminary hearings and information as to charges); id. § 180 Reporters' note
(citing bilateral agreements providing for alien access to courts).
58. See id. § 179 Reporters' note 2 (citing constitutions of Albania, Brazil, Costa Rica, and
Czechoslovakia, providing for preliminary hearings).
59. See id. § 179 Reporters' note 1; id. § 180 Reporters' note.
60. See id. § 180 Reporters' note.
61. See supra note 25.
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IV. THE NEED FOR A CONTEMPORARY RECONSIDERATION
In the Reporters' view, growing interest in the acceptance of in-
ternational human rights law appears to account principally for the
"cosmetic" changes in the law of S.R.I.A. proposed in section 711
of the Revised Restatement. According to the Reporters' "Intro-
ductory Note, ' 62 two factors explain the influence of human rights
provisions: first, a perceived similarity of purpose and orientation
between human rights law and the law dealing with the rights of
aliens, and second, the adoption and incorporation of international
human rights documents into U.S. law."
As the Reporters admit, there is no doubt that the law of state
responsibility has an older origin than the law of human rights, has
undergone a separate historical development, and to some extent,
responds to different conceptual concerns. 64 Also, rather than fo-
cusing upon the conduct or rights of individuals, the law of
S.R.I.A. implicates directly the juristic personality of the state. "In
legal principle the injury to the person has been seen as an offense
to the state of his nationality. The offense being to the state, the
remedy for the violation also runs to the state . ,,"I The law of
human rights is a much more recent phenomenon ("developed
largely since the Second World War"), 6 and focuses its attention
upon natural persons and their rights as human beings and not
merely as aliens:
62. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 137.
63. Professor Lillich expands upon and ultimately persuasively qualifies the significance
of this second factor. See Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 397-99. He states, for
example, that "the Universal Declaration, a United Nations resolution not requiring ratifica-
tion, has become over the past thirty years a part of customary international law." Id. at
397. "[I]t may be argued that the norms contained in the two International Covenants and
other international human rights instruments ... have become transmuted into norms of
customary international law binding even States which have not ratified them." Id. at 397-
98. He also argues that the content of human rights instruments are at least part of the
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Id. at 399.
64. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 137. See generally E.
Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915); A. Freeman, The Interna-
tional Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (1938 & photo. reprint 1970); Lillich,
Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 343-56; Spiegel, Origin and Development of Denial of
Justice, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 63 (1938). For a discussion of early English attempts to make
foreign sovereigns responsible for injuries to English subjects, see Clark, English Practice
with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 Am. J. Int'l L. 63 (1933).
65. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 137. See generally L. Sohn
& T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (1973).
66. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 138.
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It reflects general acceptance that every individual
should have rights in his or her society which the state
should recognize, respect and ensure. . . . It reflects gen-
eral acceptance, too, that how a state treats individual
human beings, including its own citizens, in respect of
their human rights, is not the state's own business alone
. . . , but is a matter of international concern and a
proper subject for regulation by international law. 7
Despite these differences between the law of S.R.I.A. and the law
of human rights, the Reporters opine that there is an "essential
affinity" and an "increasing convergence" between the older and
newer law.68 Both are based upon the concept of a universal stan-
dard of justice which is anchored in long-standing natural law
principles and which transcends the systematic and substantive
differences among various legal systems. As the Reporters state:
The law of responsibility to aliens posited, and invoked,
an international standard of justice to individuals, even if
dogmas of the international system limited the applica-
tion of that standard to foreign nationals. That standard
of justice, like contemporary human rights law, derived
from historic conceptions of natural law, as reflected in
the conscience of contemporary mankind and the major
cultures and legal systems of the world. 9
The two juridical developments "converged" in the characteriza-
tion of the state's breach of duty in regard to the treatment of
aliens. In many instances, the breach of duty was deemed to be
violative of the alien's human rights:
As the law-of human rights developed, the law of respon-
sibility for injury to aliens, as applied to natural persons,
began to refer to violation of their "fundamental human
rights," and states began to invoke contemporary norms
of human rights as the basis for claims for injury to their
nationals. 0
A merger of the older and newer doctrines, the Reporters allege,
67. Id. See, e.g., E. Haas, Human Rights in the Modern World (1948); H. Lauterpacht,
International Law and Human Rights (1968).
68. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 139.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 139-40.
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would not rob the law of S.R.I.A. of its autonomy and separate
utility, but would merely give a different and more recognizable
substantive expression to one of its cardinal objectives.71
The Reporters also justify their recourse to a human rights ori-
entation in section 711 of the Revised Restatement in terms of the
incorporation of human rights provisions and documents into U.S.
law. "The U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization of
American States, both of which include human rights provisions,
are treaties of the United States. 7 2 In addition, the United States
is a party to some of the human rights conventions; these conven-
tions are U.S. treaties and therefore, the law of the land. Federal
statutes refer to "internationally recognized human rights. ' 73 Fi-
nally, the Reporters note that "[t]he customary international law
of human rights . . . is also law of the United States.
'74
In terms of assessing the impact of the Revised Restatement, it
is equally significant to note the Reporters' disposition in regard to
the relevance of U.S. constitutional law concepts and terminology
to the elaboration of S.R.I.A. norms. The Reporters recognize the
vital role which the U.S. Constitution plays in the domestic legal
system in safeguarding individual rights. 5 Given the magnitude of
71. The Reporters state:
The traditional law of responsibility for injury to aliens, however, retains inde-
pendent vitality, providing an additional foundation for protecting the human
rights of foreign nationals, as well as continued protection for injuries that may
not be seen as violations of human rights. The traditional law of responsibility
for injury to aliens also continues to protect juridical persons, which do not have
human rights.
Id. at 140. The latter sentence may well reflect only the Reporters' views and may be quite
erroneous. Corporations or juristic persons may have human rights. For example, under the
European Convention on Human Rights, corporations and shareholders are protected. See,
e.g., Fatouros, Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility, in International
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 361, 371 (R. Lillich ed. 1983).
72. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 145. See Lillich, The Role
of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 153 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, §§ 116(a), 502(b), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(a),
2304 (1982); Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, §
112(a), 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982); International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, §§ 701(a),
703, 22 U.S.C. §§ 262c note, 262d (1982).
74. Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 146. For a discussion of
human rights law in the United States, see Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 405 (1979).
75. See Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 147. "The principal
safeguards for individual rights in United States law are those provided by the Constitution
and laws of the United States and of the States." Id.
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its domestic stature, the constitutional law heritage "'has substan-
tial significance for the foreign relations of the United States or
has other substantive international consequences.' " In fact, one
could opine that one of the strengths of the traditional law of
S.R.I.A. resides in the fact that some of its content has been de-
rived from concepts of procedural due process, which were devel-
oped under constitutional standards. Such recognition would seem
to preclude any restrictive attitude that would minimize or seek to
eliminate from a statement of the law of S.R.I.A. those concepts
and terms which have a constitutional law substratum, and which
traditionally have figured in the articulation of S.R.I.A. rules.
V. A CRITICISM OF THE ADOPTED METHODOLOGY
The shift in focus from the Second Restatement provisions to
the content of section 711 is indeed considerable. Subsuming much
of the law of S.R.I.A. (that part dealing with injury to natural per-
sons) into the emerging and established provisions of human rights
law has the effect of subordinating the law of state responsibility
as a legal doctrine and destabilizing its established basis. By bury-
ing the traditional rules of S.R.I.A. in their notes, the Reporters
achieve a result opposite from and inapposite with their stated in-
tent. In effect, in their attempt to buttress the law of S.R.I.A., they
have actually weakened it. Breach of the state's duty in this regard
is no longer defined according to the usual juridical categories spe-
cifically applying to the law of state responsibility, but rather in
terms of customary and conventional human rights principles. This
is not a mere "convergence" or merger of two doctrinal currents; it
represents, in effect, a devaluation of the law of state respon-
sibility.
Nonetheless, as noted by the Reporters, 7 there is no doubt that
some of the law generated by the development of human rights has
become an official part of applicable U.S. law through the process
of ratification. However, "[s]everal major human rights agreements
have been signed by the United States but not yet ratified."7 8 Al-
76. Id. (quoting Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
scope note at 1 (Tent Draft No. 1, 1980)).
77. Id. at 145-48.
78. Id. at 146. See generally Schneebaum, Human Rights in the Federal Courts: A Review
of Recent Cases, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 287 (1983); Shestack, The Rise and Decline of Human
Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, 15 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 19 (1983); Note, Application of
International Human Rights Agreements in the United States Courts: Customary Interna-
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though it could be argued that some of those human rights instru-
ments which have not been ratified by the United States are never-
theless part of U.S. law since they have become part of customary
international law,"9 it remains that the United States is a party to
only a few human rights conventions."0 Consequently, we might
not be so far removed from the point at which at least one U.S.
court has referred to human rights as idealistic non-
sense-"gobbledygook.' '"I In addition, despite their desire to estab-
lish an interface between international human rights and those as-
pects of the law of S.R.I.A. (such as the international minimum
standard) which reflect U.S. constitutional norms,82 the Reporters'
concern with giving first billing to the law of human rights has led
them to minimize (perhaps inadvertently) that aspect of U.S. legal
culture which is unequivocally protective of individual rights-its
constitutional procedural heritage.
The abandonment of specific procedural considerations and the
general reduction, if not elimination, of the usual state responsibil-
ity language in section 711 have led to the statement of broad-
gauged human rights concepts, serving as an ersatz for otherwise
established and more precise S.R.I.A. rules. These changes bring
up the question of what they imply as to the purpose of the Re.
statement. During the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, Professor Henkin took pains to emphasize that "the
tional Law Incorporated into American Domestic Law, 8 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 207 (1982);
Note, Toward A New U.S. Human Rights Policy: An Interim Proposal, 15 Case W. Res. J.
Int'l L. 397 (1983); Symposium on International Human Rights Law in State Courts, 18 Int'l
Law. 57 (1984).
79. See supra note 63. To some (if not a very considerable) extent, the Reporters confirm
the thesis advanced by Professor Lillich. See Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 397-
99. In discussing the major human rights agreements that have not been ratified by the
United States, the Reporters state that:
Even in the absence of U.S. ratification, some provisions of these covenants and
conventions reflect principles of customary international law and thus are a part
of the law of the United States. See § 702. The acts forbidden by the covenants
and conventions generally are acts that are prohibited by the United States Con-
stitution or by federal or state law; the obligations imposed on the United States
by those instruments are in fact generally honored pursuant to federal or state
law.
Restatement (Revised), supra note 1, introductory note at 147. See also id. at 153-56.
80. Id. at 145-147, 151, 153-155.
81. See Turner v. Ward, No. 30-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), summarized in Int'l Prac.
Notebook, Oct. 1977, at 5.
82. See, e.g., Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1582 (1981). See also
Henkin, supra note 74.
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coming of human rights" has influenced the law relating to the
treatment of aliens, and that the drafting pattern for the Restate-
ment was in the process of being changed to "fairly stark and lean
black letter and fuller Comments and still fuller Reporters'
Notes. '8 3 Elaborating on the latter point, Professor Henkin stated
that "[w]e are satisfied that we propose no major change of sub-
stance" and that "[t]he distribution between black letter and Com-
ment and Reporters' Notes is partly a matter of taste and style.","
Henkin also was of the opinion that black letter had become, in
many instances, an inappropriate vehicle by which to state the law
"when the situation in international law is so different from what
it was twenty-five years ago.""5 Finally, on this score, he stated
that "we have here. . minimized the use of black letter. We find
that black letter is the Institute shouting. It does not say very sub-
tle things. On Comment we can converse, and the Reporters
whisper down in the Notes. The experience with the black letter in
the first Restatement was really not encouraging. ....81
These changes, at least as they are felt in section 711, seem to
indicate that the basic stature and objective of the Restatement
have been modified. It no longer appears to be a statement, con-
ceived in the fundamental juridical tradition of the national legal
system, of what international law is, but rather the expression of
the view that human rights law not only has come of age, but is a
dominant force in the international legal system and, as a conse-
quence, in the American conception of international law. If the
changes proposed in the Revised Restatement are implemented,
the Restatement could be viewed more as a restatement of the law
as one might hope it will become in a global context rather than
what international law provides or how an international tribunal
would rule on a given issue. Rather than a clarification of the law,
it seems that an implied objective of section 711 is to generate and
achieve consensus on the importance of human rights law in the
international system, including its indirect impact in such areas as
the law of S.R.I.A.
To some extent, these implied objectives may explain (and really
work hand-in-hand with) the insistence upon the modification of
83. A.L.L Proceedings, supra note 2, at 227.
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drafting techniques. It goes without saying that, if the objective is
to increase the international currency of the Restatement and have
it act as a tool for building international consensus on a given issue
of international law, then the use of black letter to deliver a state-
ment of the status of the law might well be counterproductive and
invite failure. The use of or reference to the general language of
international agreements may be a more effective way in which to
proceed. "Shouting" would be inappropriate; "conversing" and
"whispering" in the ancillary materials would allow for the quiet
and diplomatic statement of possible disagreements, possibly fos-
tering resolution.
To some degree, this shift in drafting technique and basic meth-
odology in the Revised Restatement regarding the law of S.R.I.A.
is reminiscent of the veering of approach which took place in the
I.L.C.'s work on state responsibility. Following the departure of
Garcia-Amador, Professor Ago, appointed as Special Rapporteur
on State Responsibility in 1963,87 successfully recommended to the
I.L.C. that it "drop the subject of State responsibility for injuries
to aliens and take up a new and markedly different subject-the
international responsibility of States in general."8 8 However, some
members of the I.L.C. Sub-Committee on State Responsibility ex-
pressed serious doubts during the Sub-Committee deliberations
about the utility of codifying the "general and rather theoretical
aspects of State responsibility." 89 Although Professor Ago subse-
quently defended the merits of this more abstract approach,90
87. See Report by Mr. Roberto Ago, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsi-
bility (approved by the Sub-Committee), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/152 (1963), reprinted in [1963]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963/Add.1 [hereinafter cited as Ago
Report].
88. Baxter, Reflections on Codification in Light of the International Law of State Respon-
sibility for Injuries to Aliens, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 745, 746 (1965).
89. Ago Report, supra note 87, at 11, reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 231.
90. See Ago, First Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 & Add.1 (1969),
reprinted in [1969] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1; Ago,
Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 & Add. 1 (1970), reprinted in
[1970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1; Ago, Third Re-
port on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246 & Add.1-3 (1971), reprinted in [19711 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1971/Add.1 (Pt.1); Ago, Fourth Report
on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 & Add.1 (1972), reprinted in [1972] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1; Ago, Fifth Report on State Re-
sponsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/291 & Add.1-2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (Pt.1); Ago, Sixth Report on State Re-
sponsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/302 & Add.1-3 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977/Add.1 (Pt.1).
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prominent legal scholars, some noting that the Ago reports and
draft articles received scant attention in practice and scholarly
literature,91 criticized the approach as being pitched "at such a
high level of abstraction as to shed but dim light upon specific con-
troversies. 19 2 According to one commentator, the work done by
Ago, when compared to Garcia-Amador's efforts, "offers little or no
guidance to persons concerned with fashioning a contemporary in-
ternational law governing the treatment of aliens.""3 Under the
generalized abstraction of the Ago approach, the established rules
and doctrines of S.R.I.A. "have now the appearance of unwanted
orphans in the United Nations family."9
While the full thrust of such a pointed critique cannot in all fair-
ness be levied at proposed section 711, it does by analogy demon-
strate the deficiencies of recasting so entirely the elaborate body of
specifically tailored S.R.I.A. rules into the more fluid abstractions
of human rights law. If properly implemented, such a reformation
would be an acceptable means (if not in fact a laudable one) by
which to integrate rules with a proven past into the contemporary
fabric of the international legal system. As it stands, however, sec-
tion 711 deprives a workable set of rules of its autonomy and util-
ity as established law. Too many issues of vital practical signifi-
cance, such as questions relating to the nationality of claims, the
exhaustion of local remedies, and the measure of damages, are
completely neglected in the formal rule content of section 711. The
drastic reduction in the number of rules, the accompanying subor-
dination of key issues to the comment and notes, and the nearly
exclusive reliance upon the general language of human rights law
leaves too much unsaid and unspecified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modifications brought to the law of state responsibility for
injury to aliens in section 711 reflect a methodological change with
substantive implications. Compared to the Second Restatement,
the black-letter provisions in the Revised Restatement are consid-
erably reduced, and their economical form permits the statement
91. Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 379.
92. M. McDougal, H. Lassweil & L. Chen, supra note 19, at 762 n.92.
93. Lillich, Hague Lectures, supra note 26, at 379.
94. Goldie, State Responsibility and the Expropriation of Property, 12 Int'l Law. 63, 73
(1978).
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of only the most generalized, and therefore, neutral, of rules. Such
a statement of the law allows for the widest possible agreement on
principles, and possibly indicates that an attempt is being made to
achieve an international consensus among countries from both the
developed and developing world on the law relating to the treat-
ment of aliens.
The progression from the black-letter provisions of section 711
to the comment and Reporters' notes is a progression from the
least controversial subject matter to those issues which can trigger
debate and are genuinely controversial. It is the omission of much
of the content of the Second Restatement (i.e., the reduction of
emphasis in space and detail) from the express formulations of the
Revised Restatement, as well as the exclusive reliance on human
rights language, which constitute the Revised Restatement's prin-
cipal defects in section 711. Moreover, the abandonment of explicit
due process concerns (" 'denials of justice' are not subsumed
among violations of human rights") appears to point to a shift in
emphasis from East-West considerations to a North-South focus,
thereby attempting to bridge the gap between these various areas
of the world.
Given these features, and the Reporters' avowed objective of
stating the law of S.R.I.A. as it would be perceived and applied by
an international tribunal, one wonders whether a large part of the
law of state responsibility for injury to aliens should be muted en-
tirely and replaced by a reference to similar yet distinct human
rights provisions. Is this an adequate statement of the law?
The objective of amalgamating human rights norms with the
rules of S.R.I.A., given the similarity and convergence between the
two doctrines, is certainly a goal worth pursuing. The proposed
substance of section 711, however, engenders disequilibrium rather
than fusion. Human rights considerations not only become the cen-
terpiece of the statement of the rules for S.R.I.A., but also literally
engulf the whole of these provisions. It is indeed true that the law
of S.R.I.A. is supported by human rights norms, that it was an
early expression of human rights goals, and that there is generally
a remarkable affinity between the two doctrines. The attempted
synthesis, however, results in a radical excising of the law of
S.R.I.A.-in effect, a considerable downplaying of a set of legal
rules that has proven to be of unquestioning utility in the past.
The recognition attributed to the convergence between the two
doctrines is turned on its head when it leads to a severe neglect
and implied discrediting of the law of S.R.I.A. No policy reasons
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exist to justify, nor do editorial or drafting considerations explain,
this sacrificing of the specificity of state responsibility principles.
One might speculate that the single-minded focus on wealth depri-
vation issues in subsequent sections 5 led the Reporters to assess
insufficiently the implications of a new methodology in the treat-
ment afforded to non-wealth-deprivation injuries. In many re-
spects, the proposed substance of section 711 represents an at-
tempt to instill imagination and creativity in the evolution of the
law of S.R.I.A. In the last analysis, however, the proposed text, be-
cause of its exaggerated emphasis upon human rights law, is emp-
tied of its potential. The goal envisioned can be achieved only
through a greater methodological poise that reduces the drastic im-
balance between the convergent doctrines. One hopes that the pos-
sible reconsideration of section 711 will yield revisions which will
not miss out on the opportunity to achieve a "noble synthesis."'
95. See Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised Restatement, 25 Va.
J. Int'l L. 73 (1985); Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 Am. J. Int'l
L. 176 (1984); Schachter, Compensation For Expropriation, 78 Am. J. Int'l L 121 (1984).
96. See Lillich, supra note 11, at 19.
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